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[Vol. 64 gram protection. Another consequence of different copyright conceptions pertains to the role of formalities. Formalities are state-imposed conditions on the existence or exercise of copyright. If copyright is essentially a governmental incentive program, many formal prerequisites may accompany the grant. For example, requiring the author to affix a notice of copyright, or to register and deposit copies of the work with a government agency, before the right will be recognized or enforced is fully consistent with a public-benefit view of copyright. But these requirements clash with a characterization of copyright as springing from the creative act. If copyright is born with the work, then no further state action should be necessary to confer the right; the sole relevant act is the work's creation.
Despite these paradigms, the differences between the U.S. and French copyright systems are neither as extensive nor as venerable as typically described. 15 In particular, despite the con- ventional portrayal, the French revolutionary laws did not articulate or implement a conception of copyright substantially different from that of the regimes across the Channel and across the Atlantic. 16 The French revolutionary sources themselves cast doubt upon the assumed author-centrism of the initial French copyright legislation. The speeches in the revolutionary assemblies, the texts of the laws, and the court decisions construing the laws, all indicate at least a strong instrumentalist undercurrent to the French decrees of 1791 and 1793. 17 Similarly, while the law of U.S. letters predominantly reflects and implements utilitarian policies, U.S. law was not impervious to authors' claims of personal right. Indeed, some of the earliest U.S. state copyright laws set forth author-oriented rationales of which any modem Frenchman would be proud-and from which some revolutionary legislators might have drawn considerable inspiration. 18 This Article examines the rhetoric and policies of the first French and U.S. copyright laws as well as their application in practice. Initially, I briefly review printing privileges under the ancien rdgime. Next, I examine the early Anglo-American copyright regime, with particular reference to the policies underlying the first U.S. copyright statute, and the works it covered. I then (discussing author's integrity interests in right of first publication); Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing co-author's right to claim attribution when all credit given to another co-author); Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976 ) (discussing scriptwriters' right of integrity when television program is edited heavily by broadcaster). Further recognition of moral rights may yet emerge from our federal legislature. See, e.g., H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (rights of attribution and integrity for certain works of visual arts); REPORT OF THE REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, TECHNOLOGICAL ALTERATIONS TO MOTION PICTURES (1989). 16 . Cf. S. RICKETSON (1906) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. No. 3]. Pierre Recht suggests that a key phrase of this law's preamble was taken up by the reporter of the 1791 French law. P. RECHT, supra note 6, at 26. turn to the parliamentary speeches and texts of the French 1791 and 1793 decrees. Finally, I consider the French court decisions through 1814 construing the revolutionary copyright laws. This examination will demonstrate that the principles and goals underlying the revolutionary French copyright regime were far closer to their U.S. counterparts than most comparative law treatments (or most domestic French law discussions) generally acknowledge. The first framers of copyright laws, both in France and in the U.S., sought primarily to encourage the creation of and investment in the production of works furthering national social goals.
This study stops at the end of the Napoleonic era, substantially before the development of personalist doctrines, such as moral rights, by French copyright scholars and courts. These doctrines did provoke theoretical and practical divergences between the French and U.S. copyright regimes. 19 But the later occurrences of a conceptual breach between the two copyright systems should not obscure the significance of their initial similarities. Recognizing this early congruence is important for several reasons.
First, in addition to the inherent interest the subject of comparative eighteenth-century copyright may hold, there is some value to setting the historical record straight. Second, historical accuracy may promote future legislative harmonization; now that increasing U.S. participation in international copyright agreements and policy-making bodies calls key features of the U.S. copyright system into discussion, one can properly argue that U.S. copyright has not always been different from that of its Continental partners. The comparison of systems shows that their distinctions are neither original nor immutable. A copyright regime's initial instrumentalist formulation does not preclude later reception of more personalist notions of protection. By the same token, a modern author-oriented copyright system's reference to its utilitarian past may assist its absorbtion of newer productions perhaps remote from the core of the beaux arts.
19. These doctrines emerged surprisingly late, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. See generally P. REcTrr, supra note 6. [Vol. 64
TALE OF TWO COPYRIGHTS
II. COPYRIGHT BEFORE 1791 (MODELS AVAILABLE TO
FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY LEGISLATORS)
A. Ancien Rigime
Since the late Renaissance the French Crown regulated the publishing industry; publishing monopolies were an offshoot of royal censorship. The author, or more often, the publisher or bookseller, applied for permission to publish the work and sought the privilege of holding the exclusive right of its publication.
2 0 Under the edicts of 1777-78, the Crown afforded printing privileges to both authors and printers. The author's privilege was perpetual, but once ceded to the publisher, or if initially acquired by the publisher, it lasted only during the life of the author. 21 By the end of the ancien rdg'me, much rhetoric proclaiming the sanctity and self-evidence of exclusive literary property rights had infiltrated the copyright debate, most of it propounded by publishers invoking authors' rights for the publishers' benefit, 22 some of it by government advocates invoking authors' rights to curb publishers' assertions. 23 The system of printing privileges was conditioned upon compliance with formalities: deposit of copies in national libraries, inclusion of the text of the privilege in each printed copy, and registration of copies with the publishers' guild. 2 4 Remedies afforded by the privilege included injunctions and damages, as well as seizure, confiscation, and destruction of infringing copies. 25 In addition to controlling the right to publish the work, the Crown also regulated rights of public performance of dramatic works by vesting in the Comdie Franqaise the exclusive right to perform such works. 26 B. Anglo-American Copyright 1. Statute of Anne (1710) England was the first nation to substitute a statutory rule of copyright law for a regime of royal favor. Known as the Statute of Anne, the first copyright statute was enacted in 1710.27 Its title and preamble enunciate the policy that became the essential rationale for both English and American copyright laws: copyright is an incentive to authors to create so that the public may have access to and be enriched by their works. 28 The Statute of Anne is titled "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies." '29 Its preamble states that the Act is to discourage piracy and is "for the Encouragement of learned Men to compose and write useful Books." ' 30 The statute sought to accomplish these goals by conferring a reproduction right on authors for fourteen years, 31 renewable for another fourteen, if the author was still living. 32 The Act imposed the formalities of registration and deposit of copies as prerequisites to protection. 33 Remedies included destruction of infringing copies and damages. 34 2. The Late Eighteenth-Century U.S. Copyright System
The United States Constitution, drafted in 1787, and available in France in Philip Mazzei's French translation by at the latest 1790, authorizes a national copyright regime. In terms reminiscent of the Statute of Anne's incentive and access policy, 26 Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are given. Not that any particular class of citizens, however worthy, may benefit, but because the policy is believed to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and invention to give some bonus to authors and inventors. 3 6 Sources chronologically closer to the Constitution, however, treat the private and public interests more even-handedly. While records from the Constitutional Convention concerning the copyright clause are extremely sparse, a document dated August 18, 1787, notes that the proposed legislative powers were submitted to the Committee of Detail: "To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time. To encourage by proper premiums and provisions the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries. 3 7 The referral to the Committee of Detail thus sets forth the authors' property interest ("their copy rights") and the public interest in advancement of knowledge as separate considerations of equal weight. Similarly, in The Federalist Papers, Madison endorsed the copyright clause, asserting, "The public good fully coincides in both cases [ 4° Having himself "compiled two small elementary books for teaching the English language," 41 he set off to New Jersey and Pennsylvania to seek copyright protection. The legislatures were not then in session, but Webster enlisted prominent local academic figures in his cause. A letter signed by professors at Princeton and the University of Pennsylvania sets the tone of the arguments in favor of copyright. After praising Webster's two works as "very proper for young persons in the country," the letter urges:
Every attempt of this nature undoubtedly merits the encouragement of the public; because it is by such attempts that systems of education are gradually perfected in every country, and the elements of knowledge rendered more easy to be acquired. Men of industry or of talents in any way, have a right to the property of their productions; and it encourages invention and improvement to secure it to them by certain laws, as has been practiced in European countries with advantage and success. And it is my opinion that it can be of no evil consequence to the state, and may be of benefit to it, to vest, by a law, the sole right of publishing and vending such works in the authors of them. 42 While stressing the manifold benefits to public instruction flowing from protecting authors, Webster's fellow copyright lobbyists also invoked, on behalf of authors, the general Lockean principle that a property right arises out of one's labors. This mixed argumentation also emerges in the state copyright statutes that followed from both Webster's efforts and the next year's Continental Congress resolution encouraging the thirteen states to pass copyright laws. 43 For example, the preamble to the Massachusetts Act of March 17, 1783, first announced a public benefit rationale drawn from the English precedent, but then stated:
As the principal encouragement such persons can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature, must exist in the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and as such security is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly a man's own than that which is procured by the labor of his mind.' The first U.S. copyright statute, however, adopted a narrower view of authors' rights. The statute's title, "An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned, ' 45 suggests Congress intent to employ copyright as a means of furthering public education. The statute granted protection in these works to the author or his assigns for fourteen years, renewable for another fourteen, if 43 the author was still living. 46 The Act imposed the formalities of registration and deposit of copies, together with affixation of a notice of copyright, as prerequisites to protection. 47 Remedies included forfeiture of infringing copies and damages. 48 
C. For What Kinds of Works Was Anglo-American Copyright
Sought or Litigated?
The works generating the subject matter of copyright deposits and claims reflect the general universe of late eighteenth-century American publications. Perhaps not suprisingly for a young republic, instructive, civics-oriented works dominate the publishing catalogues. reflect republican values. Thomas Jefferson stated, "A great obstacle to good education is the inordinate passion prevalent for novels, and the time lost in that reading which should be instructively employed. ' 
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A review of the copyright records casts light on the smaller universe of works of actual or perceived economic value 5 2 and allows comparison of government policy in enacting the copyright incentive to the kinds of works for which authors and publishers in fact accepted the government's offer. Copyright practice apparently met policy goals-copyright was sought for the socially useful, instructive works that Congress had intended to encourage.
Petitions to Congress before enactment of the first copyright statute sought exclusive privileges for works overwhelmingly instructional in character. 52. Tebbel notes the "rather small" proportion of copyright registrations (556) to books published (13,000 titles recorded in Charles Evans's American Bibliography) during the first nine years of the federal statute. J. TEBBEL, supra note 44, at 142. Tebbel concludes: "Obviously, the idea and opportunity of copyright were not grasped by closes a preponderance of useful, instructional texts in deposits made pursuant to the first federal copyright statute. 54 For example, of eighty copyright deposits recorded from 1790 through 1792 in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts (the states in which most works were published), thirty-four were of grammars, geographies, or similar instructional texts and another twentysix comprised informational works such as histories and almanacs. One scholar of publishing history attributes the dominance of textbooks in copyright registers in part to Noah Webster's efforts, 5 5 and in part to national pride: "In the postRevolution textbook boom, the demand for primers, geographies and arithmetics, in both German and English, was high, as American books patriotically replaced the British texts that had been used before." ' 56 The titles of several of the instructional works deposited for copyright convey their personally and patriotically uplifting aims. reserved to quarrels over informational and similar works. A leading study has cited no copyright decisions before 1791, and only two lower court decisions 58 between that time and the U.S. Supreme Court's first copyright decision, Wheaton v. Peters, 59 in 1834. 60 Both lower court cases concerned compliance with federal copyright formalities. Both also concerned works more of utility and of laborious compilation than of imagination-in one, a "federal calculator," and in the other, Stone nonetheless is worth signaling for its restrictive interpretation of the term "book" in the 1790 copyright act. The court denied copyright protection to market reports published in daily newspapers on the ground that "books" imply some permanent contribution to knowledge; newspapers are too "ephemeral." 5 F. Cas. at 1003. Moreover, stressed the court, the daily publication of newspapers makes them ill-adapted to compliance with the extensive statutory formalities. can copyright law assert that France rejected instrumentalist theories in favor of copyright as the just and fair prerogative of creators, research in primary sources prompts a different conclusion. The various legislative texts reveal a hesitating and uneven progress toward protection of authors' rights. Authors are not securely at the core of the new literary property regime; rather, the public plays a major role. The 1791 text predominantly is preoccupied with the recognition and enlargement of the public domain. The committee report in favor of the 1793 law emphasizes that protecting authors will not prove detrimental to society.
In the 1791 decree, the author's concerns do not occupy center stage. The report on the 1791 decree arose in a dispute between dramatists and the Comddie Frangaise-the latter once the beneficiary of the exclusive right to produce theatrical works, the former once effectively indentured to the only approved theater. The decree's main goal was to proclaim the right of all citizens to open their own theaters and to produce plays, as the decree's first article states. Authors' rights are an adjunct to this freedom; just as any citizen may be a theatrical producer, so may any living author (or one dead for up to five years) be produced anywhere he wishes to be produced and only where he wishes to be produced. Plays by authors dead over five years are declared part of the public domain. The decree thus was designed to break the Comddie Franqaise's monopoly on the works of Corneille, Moliere, and Racine. 62 Seen in its overall context, the decree's recognition of authors' rights principally was a means to terminate that monopoly.
It bears emphasis that the authors' rights are hardly ascendant. The reporter, Le Chapelier, is often quoted as a great exponent of author-oriented rationales for copyright. But almost invariably, the passage quoted is taken out of context. 63 62. The Comddiens had indicated their willingness to relinquish monopoly rights in the works of living authors, but invoked the principle of nonretroactivity of new laws to insist on their continuing rights in long-deceased playwrights, such as those mentioned in the text (who, not incidentally, constituted the core of the repertory). 
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Le Chapelier did declare that "the most sacred, the most legitimate, the most unassailable, and ... the most personal of all properties, is the work which is the fruit of a writer's thoughts." 64 But he said it respecting unpublished works. Once disseminated, Le Chapelier went on to assert, the manuscript is "give[n] over to the public.., by the nature of things, everything is finished for the author and the publisher when the public has in this way [through publication] acquired the work. '65 According to Le Chapelier, the main principle is the public domain, to which authors' rights are an exception. He stressed that the new French law must put the principle and its exception in the right place; were the exception to replace the principle that "a published work is by its nature a public property," then "you will no longer have any basis for your law." ' 66 Indeed, he criticized the English copyright law for setting up a strongly protected right rather than appreciating the principle of the public domain.
The text of the 1791 law followed Le Chapelier's organiza- 66. Report of Le Chapelier, supra note 1, at 117. 67. See id. at 118. 68. The sanction for unauthorized performances was confiscation of all revenues from the performances and their award to the authors. Article IV states the extent of the new down on August 30, 1792, also reflected Le Chapelier's weak embrace of authors' rights. The January 1791 decree had not satisfied the authors' demands. The public's right to establish theaters had come into conflict with the dramatists' right to authorize public performances; particularly in the provinces, theater owners were producing plays without paying the authors the full sums demanded. Beaumarchais petitioned the Assemblie Nationale for a law that would better assure authors' property interests. The resulting decree announced in the preamble that "the right to publish and the right to public performance, which incontestably belong to the authors of dramatic works, have not been sufficiently distinguished and protected by the law." '69 However, the actual articles of the 1792 decree made dramatists' public performance rights even more vulnerable than under the 1791 decree. The 1792 decree subjected dramatist's rights to compliance with formalities. It imposed on the author the burden, at the time of the play's publication, to notify the public that the author had retained the public performance right. Articles 4 through 6 declared that the notice must be printed at the head of the text of the play and deposited with a notary. Unless these conditions were fulfilled, the dramatist's right would never vest.
Moreover, article 8 of the decree declared that plays could be freely performed at the expiration of ten years following publication. In substituting a ten-year term for the 1791 decree's life plus five years, the 1792 measure may have shortened the duration of many playwrights' protection. 7 1 law's retroactive effect. Article V confers a five-year post-mortem right on dramatists' heirs or grantees. By 1793, however, the revolutionary legislators' copyright rhetoric had shifted away from Le Chapelier's public domain principle toward recognizing a property right in authors' works even after publication. But this shift did not markedly amend the prior reserved characterization of authors' rights, much less break with it. In the new formulation, authors would still not receive protection primarily for their own sake, but recognition of their rights would serve to promote the public welfare. Indeed, jurisdiction over elaboration of a copyright law had been transferred from the Committees on the Constitution and on Agriculture and Commerce to the Committee on Public Instruction. 7 2 Enacting a copyright law formed part of a grander scheme of public education.
The report of Lakanal, 73 on behalf of the Committee of Public Instruction, at first signaled a more favorable attitude towards authors' rights. This document (which, like Le Chapelier's report, is often quoted selectively) announced in its first sentence a property right in works of authorship. 74 Lakanal also dubbed the proposed law the "Declaration of the Rights of Genius," thus stressing copyright's kinship to other great Rights of Man.
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" But other aspects of the report reveal ambiguities. For example, Lakanal's pronouncement of an author's property right is guarded. Unlike ancien regime advocates of literary property, Lakanal did not assert that "the author is the master of his work, or no one in society is master of his property. '76 Indeed, unlike Le Chapelier, Lakanal did not even affirm "the most sacred, . . . the most personal of properties. ' 77 Rather, he proclaimed that this right is "[o]f all rights the least subject to criticism, a right whose increase can neither harm republican equality, nor offend liberty. ' 7' The rhetoric here displays a looking-over-the-shoulder quality inconsistent with a firm conviction of the centrality of authors' personal claims. 9 report failed to affirm a true property right for authors. He charged that in Lakanal's report "one sees that nothing has changed in ideas, nor in legislation: the word property, it is true, has replaced that of privilege, but this property is still but a charitable grant from society. 80 The text of the 1793 decree also undercuts arguments that this law protects authors primarily because they are authors. Although in the version of the decree reported by Lakanal on July 21 there was no requirement of deposit as a prerequisite to suit, the final text incorporated the condition. As discussed earlier, 8 ' conditioning the exercise of copyright upon compliance with formalities undercuts the notion of a right inherent in the author. 82 Several early court decisions under the 1793 law held that deposit of copies, rather than simply meeting a procedural requirement, gave rise to the copyright. 83 At the least, failure to deposit the work could result in an initially protected work's selectively, removing the more insecure passages, those which claim that copyright will not harm the Republic. See E. POUILLET, supra note 63, at 14-15. Subsequently, many leading authors resorted to Pouillet's rendition, rather than to the original text. See, eg., C. COLOMBET, supra note 2, at 7; A. FRAN §ON, supra note 63, at 16. This confusion has perpetuated the view that the Revolution perceived copyright as "un v6ritable droit naturel." Id. (emphasis in original).
E. LABOULAYE, ETUDES SUR LA PROPRIfT-T LITnrRAIRE EN FRANCE ET EN ANGLETERRE xi (1858) (emphasis in original).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
This observation is shared by R. CROUZEL, LE DflP6T LUGAL 31 (1936) (quoting Vaunois, Le dipdt ldgal des imprimis en France, 1916 LE DROIT D'AUTEUR 125, 125-27).
Others also criticized the 1793 deposit requirement, but on different grounds. A deposit requirement tied to initiation of suit in effect made deposit optional when no prospect of litigation existed. As a result, the 1793 law deprived the national library of a sure means to enrich its collections, thus "undermining . . . the progress of arts and sciences.
" Cholet de Jetphort, Projet d'organisation de l'imprimerie-librairie et des arts, itats etprofessions quiy sont attachis ou qui en dipendent, adressid Sa Majestiempereur et roi (1807), reprinted in H. LEMAITRE, HISTOIRE DE DfP6T LEGAL, 3d pt., at 82 (1910).
At the same time, the nondeposit-bar to suit "conveys an indirect approval of the commerce in pirate editions, because, if one does not fulfill the deposit condition, one cannot pursue the infringer." I'd. The Judgment of Jan. 20, 1818, Cass. crim., 52 J. Pal. 5, considered compliance with formalities as giving rise to exclusive rights. The court stated that the plaintiffs "published the work in 1816 and fulfilled all the formalities prescribed for acquiring the exclusive right to sell." Id. at 12-13. The plaintiff's advocate made the same assumption when he contended that a French national first publishing abroad could nonetheless obtain falling into the public domain. 84 These rulings suggest a judicial view that the act of authorship does not itself afford a basis for recognizing or maintaining protection of authors' rights.
The prominence of the public interest (and the public domain) in the 1793 law calls to mind Anglo-American notions of intellectual property. Indeed, an observer closer to the event noted the similarity. In 1838 Charles-Augustin Renouard, author of one of the first French copyright treatises, articulated two opposing philosophies of copyright. According to one, authors are the absolute owners of their work, both before and after publication. Their property right is, like all other property rights, transmissible, perpetual, and inviolable. According to the other system of copyright thought, authors are workers and not property owners; if the laws ensure them exclusive exploitation of their works, it is by virtue of a positive grant of civil law and of a tacit contract which, at the moment of publication, intervenes between the public and the author. It is by the establishment of a privilege, created as a legitimate and fair compensation, that the full and free exploitation of a published work is forbidden to all persons composing the public. This is the system of the law of July 19, 1793 .... 15 Renouard pursued his identification of the 1793 law with instrumentalist legislation, likening the 1793 law to French and English patent laws, both of which may be characterized as state grants in exchange for the ultimate enrichment of the public domain. 86 Others agreed that the 1793 law did not afford copyright protection in France by completing the formalities to which the privilege is subject. Id. at 8.
84. In Judgment of Mar. 1, 1834, Cass. crim., 1834 Dev. & Car. 1.65, the Cour de cassation states that the 1793 law "guarantees literary property, upon condition of deposit of two copies with the Bibliothbque nationale" and refers to the "loss of that property right through failure of deposit." I& at 75. As a result of this decision, the question whether deposit under the 1793 law created, perfected, or merely served to prove, the copyright became moot: the court held that subsequent enactments (in 1810, 1814, and 1828) had substituted a different deposit requirement for that set forth in article 6 of the 1793 law. France required presuit deposit of copies of works of authorship until the beginning of the 20th century. Whereas any new idea whose demonstration or development can be useful to society belongs initially to him who conceived it, and that it would be an attack upon the rights of man in their essence to fail to deem an industrial discovery the property of its author; whereas the lack of a positive and authentic declaration of this truth may have contributed up until the present time to discourage French authors powerful guarantees of exclusive rights. Thus, parodying the Le Chapelier and Lakanal reports, Laboulaye lamented that under the 1793 law copyright had become "of all property rights the most humble and the least protected. '8 7 This examination of the legislative sources of the first French copyright laws reveals that these framers did not greet the concept of authors' property rights with the enthusiasm that later writers ascribed to them. Detailed treatment of the political, economic, social, and intellectual reasons behind this restrained embrace of copyright exceeds the scope of this Article. But two reasons for the framers' reluctance deserve at least brief notice. 88 First, generally the most vociferous advocates for authors' rights were not authors, but their publishers, or, more specifically, the Paris Community of Book Sellers and Printers. 9 Arguments for copyright therefore evoked images of guild selfinterest in a period of increasing anticorporatism. Not coincidentally the same legislator who presented the begrudging report for the 1791 copyright law, Le Chapelier, also sponsored the 1791 law dissolving guilds and corporations; the law's first artiindustry, by causing the emigration of many distinguished inventors and by causing the loss to foreign countries of a great number of new inventions from which this empire should have drawn the first advantage. Id. preamble (emphasis in original). Principles of public access and of the public domain predominate in the text of the law. See, e.g., id. art. 4 (inventor's obligation to declare the invention and deposit descriptions; the descriptions become publicly accessible upon issuance of the patent), art. 11 (all citizens may consult patent records and, in principle, descriptions), art. 15 (upon expiration of the patent, the discovery or invention belongs to society; all descriptions are rendered public, and anyone may use the invention), art. 16 (circumstances under which patent protection will be withdrawn, including false or incomplete descriptions, or two years of unjustified nonuse of the invention). cle declared that "the abolition of all kinds of corporations of citizens of the same occupation and profession is one of the fundamental bases of the French Constitution." 90 Second, and perhaps most importantly, a strong current of Enlightenment thought objected on instrumentalist grounds to any assertion of property rights in idea-bearing works: individual proprietary claims would retard the progress of knowledge. In 1776 a major exponent of this position, Condorcet, published a pamphlet on freedom of the press opposing not only censorship, but also copyright. 9 ' Publishers' broadsides had analogized literary property to real property or chattels: an author owns his writings just as one who tills the field owns the fruits thereof.
C.-A. RENOUARD, DES DROITS DES AUTEURS SUR LES PRODUITS DE
92 Condorcet challenged this analogy. He pointed out what is today called the "public goods" nature of copyright: a field belongs to only one person; by contrast, a literary work can belong to and be enjoyed by many simultaneously. Social intervention is needed to create and secure a property interest in such a work. If society is to intervene, the creation of a privilege must be necessary, useful, and just. To Condorcet, publishers' privileges, as they had developed by 1776, were none of these; rather, they concentrated power over books and thus power over ideas in a few hands. Condorcet therefore concluded that exclusive rights in literary works diminished, rather than enhanced, public debate.
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Condorcet's position was to change. The Revolution's suppression of privileges and the concomitant collapse of the publishers guild did not produce the outpouring of intellectual creations that might have been expected. In her illuminating study of the Paris publishing industry, Professor Carla Hesse observes that while abolition of the guild promoted the publication of pamphlets, broadsides, and works of similarly short length and timeliness, it also severely undermined the book trade. 94 This phenomenon led revolutionary thinkers and legislators to perceive a crisis in ideas and letters. Unless some sys- tern of incentive and economic security were restored, book production, and hence the dissemination of the Enlightenment itself, might cease. Authors' exclusive rights became necessary to the perpetuation and further flowering of revolutionary ideals. Professor Hesse asserts that Condorcet as a result collaborated with the Abb6 Sieyes on a proposed new press law (not passed), whose articles 14 through 21 stated: "The progress of the enlightenment, and thus of the public good, join themselves to ideas of distributive justice, to require that the law assure to authors the property right in their works." 95 One may conclude that Condorcet, like Le Chapelier, perceived the public domain as the principle and copyright as an unhappy exception that practice had proved necessary and useful. Under this view, a just copyright law should be no more extensive than required to promote the public good. Thus, if as I argue, instrumentalist policies did indeed promote and infuse the revolutionary legislators' recognition of the exclusive right of reproduction, those policies may have derived from suspicion of proprietary rights in works of authorship, both as a matter of Enlightenment theory and antiguild practice. I do not mean to suggest that French revolutionary legislators perceived copyright solely as a vehicle to foster the public welfare. Sympathy for authors' claims of moral entitlement to rights in their works surely influenced enactment of the 1791 and 1793 decrees as well. After all, the revolutionary copyright laws were drafted and enacted in a general climate formally recognizing natural rights, including the "sacred" right to property enunciated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man. 96 My point is that mixed motives underlay the French revolutionary copyright laws (as well as their U.S. counterparts) and that the parliamentary speeches and the texts of the laws themselves attest to a certain tension between authors' personal claims of right and the public interest in access to works of authorship. Thus, without denying the presence of a strong authors' rights current in the revolutionary laws, I would suggest that the revolutionary legislators generally resolved that public-versus-private tension by casting copyright primarily as an aid to the advancement of public instruction. 
B. Revolutionary Copyright Practice: For What Kinds of Works Was French Copyright Litigated? What Kinds of Arguments Did the Advocates Press?
If the motivations for enacting the first French and U.S. copyright laws were similar, what of the works they yielded? Comparison of the subject matter the two laws covered suggests that the two nations sought to promote dissemination of different kinds of works. The U.S. Constitution authorized Congress to create a copyright system to "promote the progress" of knowledge. Congress adopted a rather pragmatic view of the kinds of works that achieved that objective: the first copyright law protected maps, charts, and books-in that order. The great majority of works for which authors or publishers sought copyright protection under that first statute were highly useful productions.
The first French copyright law extended not merely to "writings of all kinds" but to "all productions of the beaux arts." 97 Putting the two texts side by side, one might conclude that one law promoted Utility while the other sought Beauty. In fact, reports of French copyright infringement cases through 1814 indicate that, as in the U.S. and England, works of information or instruction were most often the subject matter of copyright litigation.
Moreover, even when the complaint of the French copyright owner concerned works of higher Arts and Letters, the arguments of the advocates would nonetheless sound familiar to an Anglo-American copyright litigant: incentive rationales loom large in the reasoning of lawyers and courts. 98 The French copyright law may have protected a broader range of subject matter, but in both French and American cases, the subject matter advanced state interests. If the U.S. framers feared that art might distract hard-working citizens from useful achievements, 99 the French revolutionaries saw art, or at least some kinds of 
1990]
art, 1 0 in the service of utility.
Art glorified the French Revolution and spread its ideals. A criminal copyright infringement affair from the Year 7 of the Republic illustrates the point. 101 The work at issue was a play. Theatrical works were among those creations that the Revolution sought to encourage. 10 2 The pleading stressed the utility of dramatic works in disseminating the Enlightenment and the Revolution. The prosecutor, complaining of inadequate enforcement of dramatists' rights in the provinces, declared:
Shall literary properties be less sacred in the eyes of the republican judge than other properties? It is to the wise men, to dramatic authors, to all literary authors that we principally owe the uncontested superiority of the French language over all the languages of Europe. It is they who render all nations tributaries to our arts, tastes, genius, glory; it is through them that the principles and rules of a wise and generous liberty penetrate beyond our borders and sphere of activity. 103 I turn now to a more systematic review of copyright infringement actions and decisions under the law of 1793 (through 1814). This review examines both the subject matter and legal basis of the claims, and the nature of the arguments presented by the parties or sustained by the courts.
Of the thirty-seven controversies I have been able to gather (some controversies consist of multiple hearings and appeals), the subject matter of twenty-one concerns informational works. Another fifteen cases concern works of drama, music, art, poetry, or fiction. And the subject matter of one case is undisclosed. However, the initial subject-matter distinction between information and art is not entirely satisfactory: many of the 100. Jefferson and the French revolutionaries agreed to this extent: In France too, novels, it seems, were a disfavored form of literary expression. 
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works of drama and poetry at issue purport not merely to entertain, but also to educate. 1°4 Regarding the claims or defenses at issue, of these thirty-seven controversies, eleven decisions concern formal or procedural defects in the copyright or its enforcement. 1 0 5 This subject-matter breakdown does not purport to reflect the overall relationship of published works of utility to published works of entertainment; 1 0 6 rather, identification of the kinds of works that spawned litigation serves to indicate the kinds of works that generated sufficient popular demand to encourage piracy. Reference to the many decisions involving formal or procedural defects may elucidate the efficacy of the 1793 law in protecting authors' rights. Frequent foundering of authors' claims on these rocks suggests a copyright regime ill-adapted to vigorous enforcement of, and therefore perhaps not warmly receptive to, the author's monopoly.
Many decisions as reported forgo explaining the courts' rationales; they simply state the subject matter and the result. From the more detailed decisions, what approach to copyright emerges? While some decisions assert or presume that copyright inheres in the author, others, perhaps the majority, express or rely on more external justifications for protection. In the first group, a controversy from Year 2107 involved sales of unauthorized copies of memoirs. The plaintiff claimed the exclusive right of reproduction and distribution. Although some sales of the allegedly infringing copies took place after July 1793, the defendant contended that it acquired the copies before passage of the July 1793 copyright law. The defendant offered not to sell unauthorized copies in the future. Challenging the retroac- tive application of that law, the defendant disclaimed liability for prior acts of copying and distribution. The court ruled for the plaintiff, holding that "natural fairness, the first of all laws, sufficiently warned the printers and booksellers that it was not permitted to appropriate the productions of others, and that any time one harms the property of another, one is essentially obliged to compensate the harm suffered." The court's reasoning presumes that, even absent a law regulating booksellers, the author has a property right. Yet the court identified no formal source of this property right, 10 8 but apparently perceived it as arising out of the creation of the work. Moreover, the court did not refer to any public benefit derived from protecting authors.
A later decision, Buffon c. Behmer, 1 0 9 also recognized copyright protection for pre-1793 works, but not exclusively because of general fairness or an inherent property right. Rather, the Tribunal de cassation ruled that privileges granted under the 1777-78 edicts, if not expired under their own terms, remained in force. The reasons offered for the persistence of ancien regime printing privileges are of particular interest to this study.
Buffon's widow had charged a copyright infringement of Natural History, whose forty-year printing privilege granted under the ancien regime had not yet expired. The defendant responded that the August 4, 1789, decree generally abolishing ancien rdgime privileges had terminated the work's protection and cast it into the public domain, and that the August 20, 1789, decree establishing freedom of the press entitled the defendant to publish whatever he wished. Buffon's widow appealed to the Tribunal de cassation, arguing that the August 4 decree did not apply to an author's rights under the prior edicts because these rights were not feudal and therefore were not targeted by the general abolition of privileges. Similarly, she contended, the August 20 decree simply recognized that "each man being the master of his own thoughts may write and publish them as he desires"; 110 the decree in no way authorized the appropriation of the works of others.
In holding that the 1777 decrees remained in force until [Vol. 64prospectively superseded by the 1793 law, the court declared that the decrees of August 1789, which abolished privileges and distinctions, and set the press free, have no relation to the property acquired by an author in his work, and which is simply the legitimate compensation for his work, and the price naturally owing for the enlightenment which he spreads throughout society. I I
The court invoked both personal and external justifications for protection; it grounded the author's rights both in the act of creation and in the public benefits flowing from it. Thus, the court first endorsed the notion that authors have property rights in their works as the fruit of their labors, but then invoked the policy (fundamental to Anglo-American copyright) that copyright rewards authors because they contribute to the advancement of public instruction.
Other cases also contain reasoning consistent with the twin Anglo-American copyright goals of encouraging investment in, and the creation of, works of authorship to promote public education.1 2 One of these, the protracted affair of the Dictionary of the Acadimie franqaise, 1 3 merits attention both for the statements of the government official intervening on behalf of the plaintiffs, and for the Tribunal de cassation's holding. The plaintiffs were publishers who succeeded to rights granted by the revolutionary authorities to a prior publisher to prepare a fifth edition of the Dictionary. A new edition had been in preparation when the Acadimie franqaise was suppressed by the decree of August 8, 1793. Plaintiffs' edition, incorporating the academi- cians' notes for new articles, appeared in Year 6. Three years later, the defendants published a new edition of the Dictionary, based on the edition last published by the Acaddmie and updated with the defendants' own new articles.
In the ensuing infringement action, the defendants disputed plaintiffs' copyright interest, arguing that with the abolition of the Acaddmie franqaise, the Dictionary became public property, available to all to republish or revise. The defendants also indicated that if anyone had a property interest in the Dictionary, under the terms of the 1793 law' granting copyright to "authors" ' 114 and designating the "true owner" as the person to whom the infringer must pay damages, 115 that person could only be the Dictionary's actual writers, not the State or the State's publisher-grantees. Countering this defense, the commissaire du gouvernement Merlin evoked a concept of authorship and of copyright that we would now consider far more American than French. Today the French copyright system generally proceeds from the principles that the "author" is the actual physical creator of the work and that the creator's status as an employee or commissioned party in no way affects authorship or initial title to copyright. 1 16 (By contrast, U.S. copyright has embraced the doctrine of "works made for hire,"' 17 designating as "author" and initial owner the employer or, in certain circumstances, the commissioning party. 1 18 ) Construing the 1793 French law to favor plaintiffs' ownership claims in the Dictionary, Merlin declared that the plaintiffs were the lawful grantees of the State, and the State was the proper copyright owner of the Dictionary. but also those who have had it written by others, and who have had the work done at their expense. ... The rights that belong to the nation belong to it because it is the nation which itself instituted and paid the Acad6mie frangaise to compose this dictionary. 1 9 The court upheld the plaintiffs' assertion of a copyright interest on the ground that the plaintiffs were the "true owner[s]" envisioned by the 1793 text:
In the letter, as well as the spirit of the law, the true owner to compensate for the infringement is the owner of the original publication, that is, the publisher, because under the tort of infringement only the publisher's interests are harmed by the infringement of the original edition. 120 The court's reasoning diverges from a view of copyright as the proper reward for the author's creativity. Rather, the real party of interest was the person who financed and disseminated the work. The court may have perceived the publisher as the proper claimant of a right to compensation for its investment. But contemporary publishers did not directly claim such rights for themselves; they claimed to be the contractual beneficiaries of the authors' rights. 121 The court appears to identify the publisher as the true owner because, by funding and distributing the work of authorship, the publisher is the vital link between the work and its public. 122 Other decisions casting doubt on the supposed author-centrism of French revolutionary copyright turn on the plaintiff's compliance with formalities and the place of the work's first publication. In these cases, the emphasis on territorial factors 120. 3 J. Pal. at 300. In a later stage of the proceeding, the court rejected defendants' assertion that their edition did not infringe plaintiffs' because they had not copied plaintiffs' new material, but had added their own new articles. Citing both the 1793 law and the 1777 decree, the court held that copying and revising the underlying work was also infringement. or on fulfillment of state-imposed conditions 124 suggests that the magistrates did not consistently perceive copyright as a right inherent in the author. For example, the role of the deposit of copies with the Bibliothe'que nationale as constitutive or merely declarative of the author's rights remained ambiguous throughout the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods.12 5 If deposit constitutes, rather than simply proves, copyright, then the right cannot arise out of the mere act of authorship.
Similarly, judicial pronouncements respecting the territoriality of authors' rights undermine the traditional characterization of revolutionary copyright as a confirmation of rights inherent in the author. The key element in these cases is not authorship, but completion of acts within French territory. Several controversies involved works copied in territories that subsequently became annexed to France, or works that were initially published and sold abroad. In the annexation cases, the courts generally held that once the territory became part of France, defendant publisher was bound by French law, even concerning copies made before annexation. 126 On the other hand, if the work was first published abroad (in a territory not annexed to France), and a third party published and deposited copies in France before the author, the author had no rights in France, even if the author became a French citizen. 127 Because acts within the French territory were dispositive, even a stranger to the work could acquire the rights of an author in France if he became the first to publish there. Not until the middle of the nineteenth century did France extend copyright to foreign authors based on their authorship status, rather than on the basis of first local publication. 128
IV. CONCLUSION
This examination of the French revolutionary sources of copyright law reveals that revolutionary legislators, courts, and advocates perceived literary property primarily as a means to advance public instruction. Contemporary authorities certainly also recognized authors' claims of personal rights arising out of their creations, but the characteristic modem portrayal of French revolutionary copyright as an unambiguous espousal of an author-centric view of copyright '2 9 requires substantial amendment. Similarly, this study has shown that familiar conceptions of early U.S. copyright also warrant reconsideration. If U.S. copyright's exponents sought to promote the progress of knowledge, they also recognized that the author's labors are due their own reward. The revolutionary French and American systems shared much not only in theory, but also in practice. In both systems, formalities encumbered, and sometimes defeated, the acquisition or exercise of copyright protection. And both systems primarily protected works useful to advancing public instruction. An appreciation of the similarities between the initial French and U.S. literary property regimes may hold significance for modem copyright systems because it undermines historical assertions of the inherent and original incompatibility of the French and Anglo-American approaches to copyright. In fact, modem advocates of international copyright harmonization may draw upon a rich tradition of copyright congruity to formulate mutually acceptable principles for the protection of works of authorship.
reference to reciprocity. On the other hand, France required that the work be protected in its country of origin. On appeal, plaintiff-publisher argued that the author is not required to accomplish some act to create his rights, but only to relinquish them. Plaintiff contended that the author's rights do not "degenerate into public property" without either the author's written consent or an express legal disposition. According to plaintiff, the 1793 law's deposit requirement was not sufficiently specific; it did not affect the property rights in existence, it only conditioned the ability to bring a court action to enforce the property right.
Defendant-bookseller argued that full rights do not attach until the author has complied with the deposit because the deposit requirement "is founded in the interests of all, upon the need to promote the sciences and arts." Id. at 432. The court reversed, without further discussion of the role of deposit other than the observation that plaintiff, by depositing copies prior to initiating suit, complied with the 1793 law. 21. Judgment of 29 therm. an 12, Cass. crim., [1791] 1 Dev. & Car. 1.1023, Veuve Malassis c. Busseuil (works by clerics; bishops held to own copyrights like other citizens; rationale: "the more publicly useful the work and the more it is related to public instruction, the more necessary it is to eliminate counterfeit editions that are not avowed by their authors"). 22 . Judgment of 5 brum. an 13, Cass. crim., [1808] 2 Dev. & Car. 1.12, 4 J. Pal. 220, Letourmy c. Huet-Perdoux concerned a design for wallpaper, comprised of designs taken from prior sources; plaintiff argued that the combination of the two prior designs yielded a work "eiltirely new." He also suggested, "The point is not to determine whether the design copied by [defendant] is my own property. But it is certain that I was the first to deposit it at the Bibliothe'que nationale." 4 J. Pal. at 220. The court held protection to be reserved to "those who truly are authors, those to whom belongs the first conception of a work." 2 Dev. & Car. at 12-13. Since plaintiff's design was copied from prior sources, he had no claim. 23. Judgment of 6 niv. an 13 
